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1. Introduction 
The Austrian School of economics—the causal-realist, marginalist, subjectivist tradition es-
tablished by Carl Menger in 1871—has experienced a remarkable renaissance over the last five 
decades (Vaughn 1994; Rothbard 1995; Oakley 1999; Salerno 1999b, 2002). Austrian economics 
flourished originally in Vienna during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, and in Eu-
rope and North America through the 1920s, then entered a prolonged eclipse in the 1930s and 
1940s. Kept alive by important contributions from Hayek (1948), Mises (1949), Lachmann 
(1956), Rothbard (1962), Kirzner (1973), and others, the Austrian tradition emerged once more 
as an organized movement in the 1970s, and remains today an important alternative to the 
“mainstream” tradition of neoclassical economics.  
It is not always clear, however, exactly what distinguishes the Austrian School from other 
traditions, schools of thought, approaches, or movements within economics and its sister disci-
plines. As a social movement, the Austrian School possesses the formal markers usually taken to 
demarcate a school of thought, such as its own institutions—specialized journals, conferences, 
academic societies, and funding agencies—and the patterns of self-citation emphasized by Crane 
(1972). Here, though, I am concerned not with the sociology of the Austrian School, but with its 
core theoretical doctrines, propositions, and modes of analysis, particularly as they apply to eve-
ryday, pedestrian, ordinary economic problems. These are the basic problems of price theory, 
capital theory, monetary theory, business-cycle theory, and the theory of interventionism, prob-
lems that are central to any approach within economics. 
Price theory—the theory of value, exchange, production, and market intervention—was what 
Mises (1933, p. 214) had in mind when he made the statement, often surprising to contemporary 
Austrians, that the Austrian, Walrasian, and Jevonian versions of marginalism “differ only in 
their mode of expressing the same fundamental idea and . . . are divided more by their terminol-
ogy and by peculiarities of presentation than by the substance of their teachings.” These are not 
the words of a young, enthusiastic author yet to appreciate the important differences among rival 
schools of thought; the essay was written in 1932, when Mises was a mature scholar. Hayek, 
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likewise, wrote in his 1968 entry for the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences that 
his (fourth) generation of the Austrian School  
can hardly any longer be seen as a separate school in the sense of representing 
particular doctrines. A school has its greatest success when it ceases as such to ex-
ist because its leading ideals have become a part of the general dominant teaching. 
The Vienna school has to a great extent come to enjoy such a success. (Hayek 
1968, p. 52) 
A few sentences later Hayek singles out “value and price theory” as the key Austrian contribu-
tion to modern economics (recognizing, of course, the influence of Marshall, and presumably 
Hicks, Allen, and Samuelson as well). 
These statements hardly can mean that Mises and Hayek failed to recognize the important 
distinctions among the three marginalist traditions, given their substantial work on the methodol-
ogy of the Austrian School (Mises 1933, 1962; Hayek 1952). Instead, they indicate that both 
Mises and Hayek considered value and price theory to be central to the Austrian tradition, an 
emphasis broadly shared among all theoretical economists. Consider that Mises’s 1932 essay fo-
cuses on the differences between theoretical economics and the historicism of the Younger Ger-
man Historical School. Indeed, Mises’s usual doctrinal targets were historicism, institutionalism, 
and other forms of what he considered to be “anti-economics,” not alternative versions of theo-
retical economics (let alone different strands within the Austrian School). In the fight for theo-
retical economics, Mises considered the Lausanne and British neoclassical tradition as allies. All 
three marginalist traditions took value, price, exchange, and production theory to be their central 
core.1 
                                                 
1 Admittedly, Hayek’s 1968 assessment of the Austrian School’s influence is harder to reconcile with his own insis-
tence (Hayek 1937, 1945, 1946) that neoclassical economists had failed to appreciate the role of knowledge and 
expectations. Hayek remained ambivalent on this point; in an unfinished draft for the New Palgrave Dictionary, 
written around 1982 (and reprinted in Hayek, 1992, pp. 53–56), Hayek describes indifference-curve analysis as “the 
ultimate statement of more than half a century’s discussion in the tradition of the Austrian School,” adding that “by 
the third quarter of the twentieth century the Austrian School’s approach had become the leading form of microeco-
nomic theory.” But he goes on to identify the school’s “main achievement” as clarifying the differences between 
“disciplines that deal with relatively simple phenomena, like mechanics, . . . and the sciences of highly complex 
phenomena.” 
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Perhaps recognizing the close ties between Austrian value and price theory and that of main-
stream economics, recent commentators have looked elsewhere for the distinguishing character-
istics of the Austrian School. Klein (2008, p. 361), for example, identifies the Hayekian notion of 
“spontaneous order” as the main contribution of the Austrian tradition, urging that the label 
“Austrian,” with its specific historical and geographical connotations, be replaced by “spontane-
ous order economics” or “Smith-Hayek economics.” Austrian economics, he argues, is part of a 
broader tradition that includes key figures in the Scottish Enlightenment, French classical liberals 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and twentieth-century thinkers such as Michael Po-
lanyi.2 
While I agree with Klein (2008) that the Austrian tradition is part of a larger, liberal move-
ment, I argue here that Austrian economics is nonetheless a distinct kind of economic analysis, 
and that the essence of the Austrian approach is not subjectivism, the market process (disequilib-
rium), or spontaneous order, but what I call mundane economics—price theory, capital theory, 
monetary theory, business-cycle theory, and the theory of interventionism. Call this the “hard 
core” of Austrian economics. I argue that this hard core is (1) distinct, and not merely a verbal 
rendition of mid-twentieth-century neoclassical economics; (2) the unique foundation for applied 
Austrian analysis (political economy, social theory, business administration, and the like); and 
(3) a living, evolving body of knowledge, rooted in classic contributions of the past but not 
bound by them.3 
A different view is found in Vaughn’s (1994) influential book on the modern Austrian 
movement. Vaughn’s characterization of the post-1974 “Austrian revival” has proved controver-
sial (Gordon 1995; Rothbard 1995; Ekelund 1997; Thornton 1999). Her interpretation of the first 
                                                 
2 Koppl (2006) urges Austrian economists to join what he calls the “heterodox mainstream,” a body of literature 
embracing  bounded rationality, rule following, institutions, cognition, and evolution, or BRICE. Austrians have “an 
opportunity to contribute to the heterodox mainstream of today and join, thereby, the emerging new orthodoxy of 
tomorrow” (Koppl, 2006, pp. 237–38). 
3 My focus here is economic theory, not methodology, so my point is different from Rothbard’s (1995) argument 
that Misesian praxeology, not the alternative Popperian, evolutionary epistemology of the later Hayek or the “radical 
subjectivism” of Lachmann, is the proper starting point for Austrian economics.  
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three generations of the Austrian School, by contrast, has received relatively little attention. 
Vaughn consistently characterizes the price theory of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Mises, and Roth-
bard as backward-looking, inconsistent, and often wrong. Their elaborations of mundane eco-
nomics, she says, are mainly verbal “neoclassical” economics, because they rely heavily on equi-
librium constructs; indeed, Menger’s price theory is that of a “half-formed neoclassical econo-
mist” (Vaughn 1994, p. 19). Menger’s distinctive Austrian contribution, Vaughn (1994, pp. 18–
19) argues, is “his many references to problems of knowledge and ignorance, his discussions of 
the emergence and function of institutions, the importance of articulating processes of adjust-
ment, and his many references to the progress of mankind.” These issues, which attracted con-
siderable attention during the “Austrian revival” of the 1970s, are discussed in Menger’s 1883 
book Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der politischen Oekono-
mie insbesondere [Investigations into the method of the social sciences with special reference to 
economics]. They are largely absent from the Principles, however. 
Specifically, Vaughn maintains that there is a fundamental contradiction in Menger and Mis-
es’s understanding of markets because they simultaneously employ equilibrium theorizing and 
talk about time, uncertainty, “process,” and in Menger’s case, institutions. Mises’s Human Ac-
tion, for example, combined “some fundamental Mengerian insights with the apparatus of neo-
classical price theory to the detriment of both” (Vaughn 1994, p. 70).  
I argue here against this characterization of Menger, Mises, and their contemporaries. As ex-
plained below, Austrian economists from Menger to Rothbard were fully aware of time, uncer-
tainty, knowledge, expectations, institutions, and market processes. Indeed, their understanding 
of these issues was sophisticated. They employed equilibrium theorizing, but in a precise and 
deliberate manner. They understood clearly the distinction between their own understandings of 
mundane economics and that of their Walrasian and Jevonian colleagues. They devoted their en-
ergies to developing and communicating the principles of mundane economics, not because they 
failed to grasp the importance of knowledge, process, and coordination, but because they re-
garded these latter issues as subordinate to the main task of economic science, namely the con-
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struction of a more satisfactory theory of value, production, exchange, price, money, capital, and 
intervention.  
2. Central Themes of Austrian Economics before 1974 
Before 1974, the bulk of Austrian economics dealt with mundane economic subjects. Men-
ger’s Principles (1871), for example, deals entirely with value, price, and exchange (plus a short 
section on money). Menger intended the Principles as an introduction to a longer, more compre-
hensive work. The planned sequel was never written, but from Menger’s notes, Hayek (1934, p. 
69) tells us, “we know that the second part was to treat ‘interest, wages, rent, income, credit, and 
paper money,’ a third ‘applied’ part the theory of production and commerce, while a fourth part 
was to discuss criticism of the present economic system and proposals for economic reform.” 
The three volumes of Böhm-Bawerk’s great treatise, Capital and Interest (1884–1912), deal 
primarily with capital and interest theory but also include the famous sections (in volume II, Pos-
itive Theory of Capital) on value and price, introducing the “marginal-pairs” approach to price 
formation. Wieser’s Social Economics (1914) ranges more widely, as did Wieser throughout his 
career, but still focuses primarily on fundamental questions of value, exchange, production, fac-
tor pricing, and international trade. The Anglo-American economists influenced by the Austri-
ans—Phillip Wicksteed, Frank Fetter, Henry Davenport, and J. B. Clark, for example—also 
viewed the core of Austrian economics as its theory of value and exchange, not knowledge, ex-
pectations, and disequilibrium.4 
Possibly the most striking example of an Austrian commitment to mundane economics is 
Rothbard’s Man, Economy, and State (1962). Of the 12 chapters in the original edition, all but 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, the third- and fourth-generation Austrians were thoroughly steeped not only in the writings of their 
Viennese predecessors, but also those of the Anglo-American Mengerian price theorists. Hayek (1963, p. 32) notes 
that “in the early post-war period the work of the American theorists John Bates Clark, Thomas Nixon Carver, Ir-
ving Fisher, Frank Fetter, and Herbert Joseph Davenport was more familiar to us in Vienna than that of any other 
foreign economists except perhaps the Swedes.” Hayek quotes a letter from Clark to Robert Zuckerkandl in which 
Clark praises Zuckerkandl’s Theory of Price (1889), saying “[n]othing gives me greater pleasure than to render full 
honor to the eminent thinkers, mainly Austrians, who were earlier in this field than myself, and who have carried 
their analysis to greater lengths” (Hayek 1939, p. 39) Hayek adds that “at least some of the members of the second 
or third generation of the Austrian School owed nearly as much to the teaching of J. B. Clark as to their immediate 
teachers.” Salerno (2006) discusses Clark’s influence on Mises. 
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two focus on the details of value, price, exchange, capital, money, competition, and the like. 
(Chapter 1 deals with methodological and ontological issues, chapter 12 with the theory of gov-
ernment intervention.) Production theory alone gets five chapters. Even if Power and Market is 
included, the book contains little about subjective expectations, learning, equilibration, emergent 
orders, and the like. Perhaps for this reason, Vaughn (1994, p. 96) states that Rothbard’s treatise 
“must have seemed to a typical reader to be more or less familiar economics presented almost 
exclusively in words with a few controversial definitions, and some strange discontinuous 
graphs.” 
Man, Economy, and State was of course intended as a more elementary and systematic pres-
entation of the contents of Mises’s Human Action (1949), which covers a broader range of phi-
losophical, historical, and sociological subjects (Stromberg 2004). Human Action begins, for ex-
ample, with a lengthy methodological and ontological sections and chapters on “Time” and “Un-
certainty.” Still, the bulk of the book—the 16 chapters comprising Parts 3, 4, and 5—deal with 
the core economic subjects of value, price, and exchange. The same is true, at least partly, of an-
other important postwar contribution to Austrian economics, Lachmann’s Capital and Its Struc-
ture (1956). Lachmann’s book includes lengthy and insightful discussions of expectations (chap-
ter 2) and “process analysis” (chapter 3), defined as “a causal-genetic method of studying eco-
nomic change, tracing the effects of decisions made independently of each other by a number of 
individuals through time, and showing how the incompatibility of these decisions after a time 
necessitates their revision” (Lachmann 1956, p. 39).5 What Lachmann has in mind here is the 
continual readjustment of the economy’s capital structure—he calls it “reshuffling” and “re-
grouping”—as firms experiment with various combinations of capital goods. Clearly, however, 
Lachmann has a specific purpose in mind, namely explaining the implications of capital hetero-
geneity for the theory of production, economic growth, and the business cycle. The book is not 
focused primarily on meta-theoretic concerns, but on the economic theory of capital itself.  
                                                 
5 Lachmann cites Hicks (1939), Lindahl (1939), and Lundberg (1937) as the main exponents of process analysis, 
though these theorists are not usually included in the contemporary “market process” tradition. 
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The main exception to this pattern is Hayek, whose influential essays on knowledge (Hayek 
1937, 1945) and competition (Hayek 1948) appeared in the middle of the century.6 Of course, 
Hayek’s reputation at this time was based on his technical contributions to monetary and busi-
ness-cycle theory (see the essays collected in Hayek 2008), and Hayek’s main interests, from his 
first writings in the late 1920s until his move to Chicago in 1950, remained economic theory, 
conventionally defined.7 More generally, while many members and fellow-travelers of the Aus-
trian School wrote on broad social themes, all regarded technical economics as the heart of the 
Mengerian project. 
By contrast, O’Driscoll and Rizzo’s Economics of Time and Ignorance (1985) contains only 
a few references to Menger and none to Böhm-Bawerk (outside Roger Garrison’s chapter on 
capital). After an introduction it contains chapters on “Static versus Dynamic Subjectivism,” 
“Knowledge and Decisions,” “The Dynamic Conception of Time,” and “Uncertainty in Equilib-
rium.” An application section follows, which features chapters on “Competition and Discovery,” 
“The Political Economy of Competition and Monopoly,” and chapters on capital and money. At 
least half the book, then, deals with ontological or meta-theoretic issues while the core principles 
of valuation, price formation, and production theory occupy relatively little space. Or consider 
the edited volume The Market Process: Essays in Contemporary Austrian Economics (Boettke 
and Prychitko 1994). Of the book’s five main parts, only one, “Money and Banking,” deals pri-
marily with a conventional economic subject; a section on “Cost and Choice” includes a chapter 
on utility theory, but even this chapter is primarily ontological, while the remaining sections fo-
cus on meta-theoretic issues (with an applied section on political economy).  
                                                 
6 Morgenstern (1935) also dealt with expectations and their role in the formation of economic equilibria.  
7 By the 1950s, Hayek tells us, 
I had . . . become somewhat stale as an economist and felt much out of sympathy with the direc-
tion in which economics was developing. Though I had still regarded the work I had done during 
the 1940s on scientific method, the history of ideas, and political theory as temporary excursions 
into another field, I found it difficult to return to systematic teaching of economic theory and felt it 
rather as a release that I was not forced to do so by my teaching duties. (1994, p. 126) 
Throughout his career at the London School of Economics from 1932 to 1949, Hayek’s main teaching obligation 
had been the required graduate course in economic theory. Of course, he did produce his first important work in 
classical-liberal political economy, The Road to Serfdom, in 1944. 
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One might infer that these works take the basic body of causal-realist price theory as given, 
as so well established that further elaboration is unnecessary, thus preferring to concentrate on 
advanced applications, methodological foundations, critiques, and the like. However, as attested 
by the statements from Vaughn (1994) quoted above, Austrians after 1974 by no means accepted 
the core principles of Austrian price theory as correct, or even as a distinct approach at all, as op-
posed to a verbal rendition of Walrasian and Marshallian economics. Instead, Austrians after 
1974 have tended to regard issues of knowledge, uncertainty, process, and the like as the distinct 
contribution of the Austrian School. 
As noted above, for Vaughn (1994) the most “Austrian” of the classic Austrian texts is Men-
ger’s 1883 collection of methodological essays. These essays attempted to defend Menger’s 
theoretical approach against the methods of the (Younger) German Historical School provoking 
the fierce reaction by Gustav Schmoller and his followers that became a full-blown Methoden-
streit. Here Menger presents his theory of “organic” institutions, what Hayek (1973–79, p. 43) 
termed “spontaneous order.”8 How is it possible, Menger (1883, p. 146) asks, “that institutions 
which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its development come into 
being without a common will directed toward establishing them”? Menger’s (1892) essay on 
money provides a detailed example of this process, in which a commonly accepted medium of 
exchange emerges as a by-product of individual traders’ decisions to adopt particular commodi-
ties as money. A monetary standard, in this sense, is the “result of human action but not the re-
sult of human design” (Hayek 1948, p. 7).9 Do these ideas relate to the price theory outlined in 
Menger’s Principles, from which they are largely absent?  
First, note that the passage dealing with spontaneous order occupies just two short chapters 
(30 pages in the 1981 English edition) in a 16-chapter (237-page) book. These chapters are un-
deniably profound and have exerted an important influence on later Austrians’ understanding of 
                                                 
8 See Klein (1997) and Klein and Orsborn (2008) on the differences between Menger’s account of institutions and 
Hayek’s understanding of spontaneous order. Klein (1997) argues that Menger’s notion of coordination is closer to 
Schelling’s (1978) than Hayek’s. 
9 See also Klein and Selgin (2000).  
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social phenomena (White 1981). However, the bulk of the text deals with Menger’s defense of 
economics as a “theoretical science,” with “exact laws,” rather than a historical science dealing 
with historically contingent, “national economies.” Second, Menger’s examples of organic phe-
nomena are not limited to language, religion, law, competition, and money. Indeed, Menger in-
troduces the concept of emergent social processes with a more mundane example: prices.  
[We] could point to a long series of phenomena of this kind. We intend, however, 
to set forth the above idea by an example that is so striking that it excludes any 
doubt of the meaning of what we plan to present here. We mean the example of 
the social prices [i.e., market prices] of goods. As is well known, there are in indi-
vidual cases completely or at least in part the result of positive social factors, e.g., 
prices under the sway of tax and wage laws, etc. But as a rule these are formed 
and changed free of any state influence directed toward regulating them, free of 
any social agreement, as unintended results of social movement. The same thing 
holds true of interest on capital, ground rents, speculative profit, etc. (1883, p. 
146) 
In other words, Menger’s concept of spontaneous order is simply the process by which voluntary 
interaction establishes social regularities such as prices, wages, interest rates, rents, and the like. 
Not only is the market system itself a product of spontaneous order, in this sense, but so are indi-
vidual market prices.  
Menger’s presentation here challenges the usual distinction (Davis and North 1971) between 
the institutional environment (or “rules of the game”) and the institutional arrangements (the 
“play of the game”) that emerge in that environment. The new institutional economics (Klein 
1998; Williamson 2000) typically treats the former—the legal system, language, norms and cus-
tom, and the like—as the results of human action but not human design, while the latter—firms, 
contracts, the terms of specific transactions—as the product of deliberate design by particular 
agents. Menger treats both kinds of institutions as “spontaneous,” meaning (generally) undi-
rected by state planners. In other words, for Menger, price theory is not a technical discipline in-
dependent of research on spontaneous orders; price theory is spontaneous-order research. Again, 
in Menger’s words:  
[M]arket prices, wages, interest rates, etc., have come into existence in exactly the 
same way as those social institutions which we mentioned in the previous section. 
 11
For they, too, as a rule are not the result of socially teleological causes, but the un-
intended result of innumerable efforts of economic subjects pursuing individual 
interests. . . . The methods for the exact understanding of the origin of the “or-
ganically” create social structures and those for the solution of the main problems 
of exact economics are by nature identical. (1883, pp. 158–59) 
3. Equilibrium in Mundane Austrian Economics 
Menger’s economics, as has been documented elsewhere (Caldwell 1990; Salerno 1999a; 
Klein 2006), is causal-realist, marginalist, and subjectivist. Despite frequent assertions that Aus-
trian economics is defined as “market process economics” or “disequilibrium economics,” the 
concept of equilibrium features prominently in causal-realist economics (Hülsmann 2000; Gun-
ning 2001; MacKenzie 2008) At least four distinct equilibrium constructs appear in Austrian 
analysis. Following Mises’s terminology, as amended by Salerno (1994a), we can call them the 
plain state of rest (PSR), the fully arbitraged state of rest or “Wicksteedian state of rest” (WSR), 
the final state of rest (FSR), and the evenly rotating economy (ERE). Two of these, the PSR and 
WSR, describe real-world outcomes, while the FSR and ERE are what Mises called “imaginary 
constructions,” hypothetical scenarios that do not obtain in reality, but are useful in economic 
reasoning, allowing the theorist to isolate the effects of particular actions or circumstances, hold-
ing all else constant. 
 The PSR obtains every day in the real world, each time a buyer and seller agree on a price 
and make an exchange, momentarily exhausting the gains from trade. (Menger called these 
“points of rest”; Böhm-Bawerk, “momentary equilibria.”) A set of potential buyers and sellers 
interacting in a defined market space can also be described as being in a PSR once the trading 
period is completed. “When the stock market closes, the brokers have carried out all orders 
which could be executed at the market price. Only those potential sellers and buyers who con-
sider the market prices too low or too high respectively have not sold or bought” (Mises 1949, p. 
245). At this point “[a] state of rest emerges.” The PSR persists as long as market participants’ 
relative valuations of the goods and services being exchanged (including speculative demands) 
remain constant. 
 12
PSR prices are not necessarily those that would emerge in the “final state of rest” (FSR), a 
hypothetical situation, never actually achieved, following a sequence of events in which the basic 
data of the market are frozen but market participants continue to trade, revising their beliefs 
about other participants’ reservation prices and obtaining better information about technological 
possibilities and consumer demands, until all feasible gains from trade are exhausted. After ana-
lyzing the PSR, “[w]e go a step further. We pay attention to factors which are bound to bring 
about a tendency toward price changes. We try to find out to what goal this tendency must lead 
before all its driving force is exhausted and a new state of rest emerges” (Mises 1949, p. 246). In 
the real economy, of course, these underlying factors are constantly changing, and hence the FSR 
is never achieved.10 
The FSR is used to trace the effects of changes in tastes, technology, expectations, resource 
availability, and other exogenous variables on patterns of resource allocation by focusing on a 
sequence of PSR equilibria in which market participants adjust their behavior until all gains from 
trade have been exhausted. As Salerno (2006) explains: 
FSR analysis also begins from a fully adjusted economy in which profits are cur-
rently zero. However in this construction the past and future are relevant to eco-
nomic planning. Alterations in the economic data are permitted to occur but only 
one at a time and with a lapse of time between changes sufficiently long to permit 
a complete adjustment of prices and production in the economy to each change, 
thus resulting in the emergence of a new zero-profit FSR before another change in 
the economic data can occur. During the transition to the new FSR, profits and 
losses appear across the economy spurring entrepreneurs to shuffle and reshuffle 
resources and capital combinations to take advantage of profit opportunities and 
avoid losses. 
Salerno (2006) notes that Mises modeled his construct after Clark’s notion of “dynamic” 
equilibrium, similar to what is called “comparative statics” in contemporary neoclassical eco-
                                                 
10 Machlup seems to have the FSR in mind when he writes:  
To characterize a concrete situation “observed” in reality as one of “equilibrium” is to commit the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. At best, the observer may mean to assert that in his opinion the 
observed and duly identified situation corresponds to a model in his mind in which a set of se-
lected variables determine a certain outcome, and that he finds no inherent cause of change—that 
is, that he believes only an outside disturbance, not in evidence at the moment, could produce a 
change in these variables. This, of course, is a personal judgment, meaningful only if the variables 
are fully enumerated and the assumptions about their interrelations are clearly stated. (1958, p. 57) 
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nomics. Mises “used Clark’s construct in formulating a ‘step-by step’ or ‘process’ analysis logi-
cally demonstrating the sequence of changes which occur throughout the entire interdependent 
system of markets in the transition to the new FSR”—for example, in tracing the effects of an 
increase in the money supply on prices and resource allocation. (Modern comparative statics, 
however, as formalized by Hicks (1939) and Samuelson (1947), abstracts from the element of 
time.) 
It is important to emphasize that the movement from PSR to FSR takes place in analytical 
time, not calendar time; FSR analysis is a logical exercise, not meant to explain the sequence of 
events taking place in real markets, for the underlying “data” are in constant flux. This point is 
not well understood, even among Austrians. For example, Boettke and Prychitko (1994) caution 
against overreliance on equilibrium theorizing in Austrian economics, even characterizing some 
of the classic contributions to Austrian economics as “neoclassical Austrianism.”11 “When Aus-
trians refer to proximity to an end state in their treatment of entrepreneurship they may be relying 
too much on the equilibrium construct” (Boettke and Prychitko 1994, p. 65). However, the caus-
al-realistic price theory of Menger and his followers does not make any assumptions about the 
“proximity” of PSR or WSR prices to their FSR values in calendar time. Instead, the theorist 
uses the imaginary construction of the FSR to explain what pattern of activities and ownership 
would obtain following an exogenous change in preferences, resource availability, or technologi-
cal knowledge, holding all else constant. The causal-realist theorist does not assume that such 
adjustments take place in calendar time; indeed, this imaginary process would be impossible in a 
world in which preferences, stocks, technology, and the like are constantly changing. 
Lying between the PSR and the FSR is the WSR, a realistic concept in which trading takes 
place while preferences remain constant, with market participants revising their beliefs about 
other participants' reservation prices until all feasible gains from trade are exhausted. Wick-
                                                 
11 Though specific Austrian writings are not identified, a footnote refers to “relevant sections” of Mises (1949), 
Rothbard (1962), Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1985) and High (1980, 1982, 1986) as “neoclassical Austrianism.” 
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steed’s (1910, pp. 219–28) fruit market provides the canonical example.12 By the end of each 
market day, a specified period in which preferences, stocks of goods, and the set of traders re-
mains fixed, what Wicksteed calls “the equilibrating price” has been achieved. In this situation, 
“the marginal position of the commodity in question is identical upon the relative scales of all 
who have secured a supply, and higher on them all than it is on the scales of any of those who 
have secured no supply” (Wicksteed 1910, p. 216). The market day is a hypothetical construct, in 
that it holds only as long as preferences, technical knowledge, stocks of goods available for ex-
change, and so on are held constant. And yet, the WSR is not a purely imaginary construction, as 
this process of equilibration takes place in real markets, at least over short periods of calendar 
time. 
Assuming the underlying data are unchanged, [this] approach yields a coherent 
explanation of how, as information becomes more complete and speculation more 
accurate, PSRs succeed one another until the intermediate equilibrium situation 
represented by a fully-arbitraged state of rest (or WSR) is brought into being. (Sa-
lerno 1994a, p. 102) 
 
The ERE, used by Mises (1949, pp. 247–51) and Rothbard (1962, pp. 320–28), serves a more 
limited function. The ERE is an imaginary construction in which preferences, technology, and 
resource availability are held constant and agents are assumed to repeat the same set of actions 
each market day. Economic activity takes place—there is production, consumption, saving, and 
investment—but entrepreneurs can predict the future with certainty. The main function of the 
ERE is to show that in the absence of uncertainty, factor prices would be bid up to their full dis-
counted marginal revenue products, eliminating entrepreneurial profit and loss. Business owners 
would still earn interest income if they advance wages to workers and other factor owners before 
production is completed and sales receipts are realized, and they can earn implicit wages on the 
labor they supply to the firm, but there can be no profits and losses. Only by using such a con-
                                                 
12 See also Marget (1938–42, vol. 2), Kirzner (1963, pp. 105–35) and Salerno (1994a, pp. 97–106). 
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struction, Mises argued, can the theorist decompose real-world business income into interest, the 
owner’s implicit wage, and entrepreneurial profit.13 
As noted above, the PSR and WSR are intended as realistic phenomena, not hypothetical 
constructs (like the FSR and ERE). Marshall’s “market-day equilibrium” is also intended to ex-
plain real-world pricing in markets, something like Wicksteed’s WSR, but includes arbitrary as-
sumptions about the marginal utility of money (Walker 1969).14 Likewise, Hicks’s “temporary 
equilibrium”—a form of Walrasian general equilibrium that incorporates agents’ expectations of 
prices that will obtain in future trading periods—shares elements of the Austrian WSR. How-
ever, it is, like Walrasian equilibrium, a deliberately artificial construct, not meant to explain ac-
tual market prices but as a modeling step in explaining a concept of intertemporal equilibrium 
(De Vroey 2002).  
Before 1974, then, Austrian economists used the realistic equilibrium constructs of the PSR 
and WSR, and the imaginary constructions of the FSR and ERE, to explain the basic phenomena 
of value, production, exchange, and price. Their work was built on Menger’s value theory and its 
underlying concepts of purpose, subjectivism, and uncertainty, and the extensions of the Menge-
rian approach to deal with price formation under direct exchange (Böhm-Bawerk’s horse market, 
Wicksteed’s fruit market), monetary calculation and indirect exchange, capital theory (the time 
structure of production and the heterogeneity of capital goods), FSR analysis, the effects of gov-
ernment intervention (business cycle theory, regulation), and other mundane aspects of commer-
cial life. 
4. Knowledge, Expectations, and the Convergence to Equilibrium 
Since the “Austrian revival” of the 1970s the mundane economic subjects described above 
have commanded relatively little attention. The most popular issues and topics among modern 
Austrians have included fractional-reserve “free banking,” political economy, and the methodo-
                                                 
13 For additional discussion see Cowen and Fink (1985), Gunning (1989), and MacKenzie (2008). 
14 Just as Mises’s (hypothetical) FSR results from a sequence of PSRs, Marshall’s “normal equilibrium” is brought 
about by a series of market-day equilibria (De Vroey 2002). 
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logical foundations of the Austrian School. During the 1980s, a lengthy debate took place over 
the existence of “equilibrating tendencies” in the market economy, with Kirzner and Lachmann 
representing opposite positions (Selgin 1988). Kirzner argued that the existence of profit oppor-
tunities under disequilibrium, and the tendency of alert entrepreneurs to discover and exploit 
these opportunities, was sufficient to establish a general, systematic tendency toward equilib-
rium. Lachmann, in contrast, maintained that in the face of “radical” uncertainty, including sub-
jective expectations, equilibrating tendencies could not be assumed, absent some explanation for 
learning. Knowledge, expectations, and the convergence to equilibrium came to occupy center 
stage in the Austrian research program. 
My purpose in this section is not to analyze this debate, but to ask why the problem of con-
vergence to equilibrium received so little attention in early Austrian writings. Neither Menger, 
Böhm-Bawerk, Wieser, the Anglo-American Austrians, nor Mises devoted much effort to this 
issue. If the presence or absence of equilibrating tendencies in the entrepreneurial market process 
is the central problem of price theory, why did the early Austrians fail to recognize it? 
First, the modern Austrian literature uses the term equilibrium quite broadly and often incon-
sistently. O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, p. 39), for example, refer to “correct” and “incorrect” 
prices, identifying the latter with “non-equilibrium” prices, although the equilibrium construct is 
not defined or discussed in detail until much later in the discussion. Vaughn (1994) refers to 
“equilibrium models” (p. 2), “equilibrium states” (p. 3), “equilibrium theorizing” (p. 8), “equilib-
rium constructs” (p. 11), and more—all within the first dozen pages!—but does not provide a 
formal definition of any equilibrium concept until the discussion of Mises in her fourth chapter 
(pp. 81–82). There she characterizes Mises’s distinction among three equilibrium constructs 
(PSR, FSR, and ERE) as “surprisingly unsatisfying” (p. 81), seemingly treating the PSR and FSR 
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as equivalent to Marshallian short-run and long-run partial equilibrium, respectively, and the 
ERE as Mises’s own idiosyncratic, and unhelpful, construction.15 
More generally, the modern Austrian literature on “disequilibrium” is not always careful to 
define the concept of equilibrium, and virtually never discusses distinctions among the PSR, 
WSR, FSR, or ERE. O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, pp. 80–85) argue that modern Austrians typi-
cally have some notion of idea of “plan coordination” in mind. Indeed, all four equilibrium con-
structs described above involve a form of plan coordination, in the sense that individuals en-
gaged in exchange hold shared beliefs about what is to be exchanged, what price will be paid, 
and so on. However, as O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, p. 80) observe, plan coordination—they call 
it “Hayekian equilibrium”—is a very general concept; it “can be partial or general, and can pre-
vail over the various ‘runs’ of Marshallian time.”16 Plans can be said to be “coordinated” in the 
PSR, in the limited sense of coordination just mentioned, without being “coordinated” in any 
broader sense, as in a longer period of time, a larger set of potential traders or bundles of goods, 
and so on. As O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, pp. 80–81) put it: “Hayekian equilibrium therefore 
must entail homogenous expectations with respect to the time period within which equilibrium 
prevails. Outside of that period, however, expectations can, and sometimes must, be divergent.” 
They go on to conclude that Hayekian equilibrium, in any form, cannot obtain in real exchange. 
“Hayek and the other Austrians did not realize that equilibrium is not a directly operational con-
struct and that the real world was never in equilibrium” (p. 81). This is clearly false, however, 
with respect to the PSR (and, to a weaker extent, the WSR), when expressed in “plan coordina-
tion” terms. 
Rothbard (1962) is somewhat imprecise in distinguishing among equilibrium constructs. His 
discussion of price determination (pp. 79–186, and passim) focuses mainly on PSR prices, 
                                                 
15 Inexplicably, she accuses Rothbard (1962) of confusing the FSR and ERE, though without providing any specific 
page reference (Vaughn 1994, p. 82n35). She also says Mises “seemed to confuse his two [sic] distinct notions of 
equilibrium.” 
16 Kirzner (2000) argues for a more nuanced appreciation of Hayek’s commitment to “plan coordination,” arguing 
(against O’Driscoll 1977) that Hayek was ambivalent on the proper notion of coordination in economics. For more 
on concepts of coordination see Klein (1997) and Klein and Orsborn (2008). 
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though he occasionally refers to prices that “tend toward” their (WSR) equilibrium values. As 
described above, every price paid in an actual transaction is a PSR price, so the concept of a 
market price tending toward its PSR value makes little sense. PSR prices can, of course, be what 
the Walrasian literature calls “false prices,” meaning that they differ from their WSR or FSR 
values.  
In his treatment of expectations Rothbard (1962, pp. 130–37) notes that the formation of PSR 
prices does not assume perfect knowledge. Indeed, the supply and demand curves underlying 
PSR analysis incorporate market participants’ expectations of future price changes, expectations 
that may or may not be consistent with those of other market participants. If expectations are in-
correct, then shortages and surpluses emerge as market participants trade at PSR prices—
Rothbard (1962, p. 134) calls them “provisional resting point[s]”— that differ from their values 
once these price differences have been arbitraged away (a state of affairs presumably like the 
WSR, though Rothbard is not explicit on this point). As these shortages and surpluses are re-
vealed, market participants will adjust their expectations until the fully arbitraged price, what 
Rothbard here calls the “genuine equilibrium price,” emerges. Rothbard does, then, assume a 
simple learning process, though he does not spell out the details of this process. However, his 
assumptions about knowledge and the ability of market participants to learn from their mistakes 
(“speculative errors”) are minimal. Market participants are assumed to adjust their expectations 
about the PSR prices that emerge moment-to-moment, in the markets in which these traders are 
active. In other words, these are very short-run expectations, not long-run expectations (in the 
Marshallian sense of the long run). 
Likewise, the Austrian price theory of Böhm-Bawerk, Wicksteed, Fetter, Mises, and Roth-
bard treats the movement of prices from PSR to WSR values as a straightforward process. It does 
not require “perfect knowledge,” only that agents are aware of surpluses and shortages (from 
trading at false prices) and that they adjust their bids accordingly. As noted above, agents’ expec-
tations about other agents’ preferences are already incorporated into the reservation bids and 
asks. While these writers were not as explicit about their assumptions concerning knowledge and 
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expectations as Mayer (1932), Hayek (1937, 1945) and the later Austrians, they were hardly un-
aware of processes underlying market clearing. Wicksteed, for example, is explicit that forecast 
errors explain the deviation of PSR prices (the “actual price”) from their WSR equivalents (the 
“ideal price”): 
A market is the machinery by which those on whose scales of preference any 
commodity is relatively high are brought into communication with those on 
whose scales it is relatively low, in order that exchanges may take place to mutual 
satisfaction until equilibrium is established. But this process will always and nec-
essarily occupy time. The persons potentially constituting the market will not all 
be present at the same time, and therefore the composition of the collective scale 
(on which, together with the total amount of the commodity in existence, the ideal 
point of equilibrium depends) must be a matter of estimate and conjecture. The 
transactions actually conducted at any moment will be determined in relation to 
the anticipated possibilities of transactions at other moments. Speculation as to 
these future possibilities will be more or less elaborate and conscious according to 
the nature of the market and the length of time over which the adjustment will be 
likely to extend. But speculation is always present when any possessor of the 
commodity refuses to sell at the moment at a price which he knows he will be 
prepared to accept ultimately (whether an hour or eleven months hence), if satis-
fied that he can do no better; or if any purchaser refuses at the moment to give a 
price to which he knows he will ultimately be willing to rise should the alternative 
be to go without the commodity; or if any one buys at a price below which he 
would ultimately sell sooner than keep the stock for his own use. (Wicksteed 
1910, p. 236) 
These forecast errors are revealed, Wicksteed continues, as traders exchange at non-WSR prices 
in real time:  
If no one at first has a correct conception of the facts, a series of tentative esti-
mates, and the observation of the transactions that take place under their influence, 
may gradually reveal them; and if we could eliminate all error from speculative es-
timates and could reduce derivative preferences to exact correspondence with the 
primary preferences which they represent, and on which they are based, the actual 
price would always correspond with the ideal price. (pp. 236–37) 
 
Salerno (1994a, p. 105) notes that Mises, in The Theory of Money and Credit, invokes arbi-
trage in his account of purchasing power parity (Mises 1912, pp. 195–203). “The money price of 
any commodity in any place, under the assumption of completely unrestricted exchange and dis-
regarding the differences arising from the time taken in transit, must be the same as the price at 
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any other place, augmented or diminished by the money cost of transport” (pp. 196–97). Hence, 
Mises  argues,  
the purchasing power of money shows a tendency to come to the same level 
throughout the world, and that the alleged differences in it are almost entirely ex-
plicable by differences in the quality of the commodities offered and demanded, so 
that there is only a small and almost negligible remainder left over, that is due to 
differences in the quality of the offered and demanded money. 
The existence of the tendency itself is hardly questioned. (p. 198; emphasis in 
original) 
Mises continues: 
 Nobody would wish to dispute the fact that costs of production differ greatly 
from one another in different localities. But it must be denied that this exercises 
an influence on the price of commodities and on the purchasing power of money. 
The contrary follows too clearly from the principles of the theory of prices, and is 
too clearly demonstrated day by day in the market, to need any special proof in 
addition. The consumer who seeks the cheapest supply and the producer who 
seeks the most paying sale concur in the endeavor to liberate prices from the limi-
tations of the local market. (pp. 199–200) 
Note that Mises treats the “tendency” of the purchasing power of money to equalize across and 
within markets, less transportation costs, as “clearly demonstrated day by day in the market,” i.e., 
as an empirical fact not requiring special explanation.  
Here it is worth emphasizing a methodological point. For modern, neoclassical economists, 
the instrumentalist approach (Friedman 1953) renders moot many such questions about the me-
chanics underlying market-clearing processes. The goal of economic theory, in this approach, is 
not to explain actual prices, but to explain hypothetical prices (for example, full-information 
prices, Nash equilibrium prices, perfectly competitive prices, and the like). It is unlikely that 
Menger and his followers, steeped in the causal-realist tradition, would simply assume that 
“equilibrium” obtains—after all, they were seeking to explain real prices, not hypothetical ones. 
They saw the processes of buyers and sellers making bids and asks, of revising their offers in 
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light of new information, and so on as real-world phenomena, not instrumental constructs like 
the Walrasian tâtonnement.17 
Lachmann, while expressing reservations about the logical consistency of market-level equi-
librium constructs such as the WSR, nonetheless recognized that Menger’s points of rest, Böhm-
Bawerk’s momentary equilibrium, and Mises’s plain state of rest represent real phenomena 
The Austrians were concerned, in the first place, with the individual in household 
and business. There is no doubt that here equilibrium has a clear meaning and real 
significance. Men really aim at bringing their various actions into consistency. 
Here a tendency towards equilibrium is not only a necessary concept of praxeol-
ogy, but also a fact of experience. It is part of the logic inherent in human action. 
Interindividual equilibrium, such as that on a simple market, like Böhm-Bawerk’s 
horse market, already raises problems but still makes sense. “Equilibrium of an 
industry” à la Marshall is already more precarious. “Equilibrium of the economic 
system as a whole,” as Walras and Pareto conceived of it, is certainly open to 
Mises’s [anti-equilibrium] strictures. (Lachmann 1977, p. 189) 
In other words, the deliberately unrealistic character of the equilibrium constructs that dominate 
neoclassical economics—and, by implication, Austrian concepts like the FSR and ERE—does 
not render the equilibrium concept itself unrealistic.  
Clearly, the Mengerian price theorists did not assume that real prices were FSR or ERE pric-
es. They allowed for subjective, heterogeneous beliefs about changes in demand, resource avail-
ability, knowledge, and the like. And Mises (1949, p. 247) is clear that the movement from the 
PSR to the FSR takes place in analytical time, not calendar time. “Between the appearance of a 
new datum and the perfect adjustment of the market to it some time must pass. (And, of course, 
                                                 
17 De Vroey argues that Marshall, too, regarded his market-day equilibrium construct as both realistic and practical, 
i.e., not requiring an underlying adjustment process: 
Two adjustment processes are present [in Marshall]: the adjustment toward market-day equilib-
rium and the adjustment toward normal equilibrium. In my view . . . the former should be inter-
preted as proceeding instantaneously, whereas the latter (to be called intertemporal adjustment) 
arises across several trading rounds. . . . 
The stationary equilibrium concept of equilibrium is in accord with the common-sense under-
standing of equilibrium—i.e., it is a point of rest. It is implied that this point does not need to be 
effectively reached; it suffices that reacting forces are triggered whenever it is not reached. Equi-
librium is thus viewed as an attractor. . . . Note also that in this line of thought, assessing the exis-
tence of equilibrium or disequilibrium amounts to making a statement about reality. (2002, pp. 
406–07) 
 22
while this period of time elapses, other new data appear.)” In other words, the real economy does 
not converge on a FSR because as the market is adjusting to one change in the data, another 
takes place, the combined effects of which cannot be known ex ante. Hence the accuracy of real-
world expectations is not central to this approach. These theorists make no assumptions about the 
tendency or PSR and WSR prices to converge toward some “final” values.  
What about “radical uncertainty”? One can perhaps imagine a market in which PSR prices do 
not “converge” toward WSR prices because of endogenous, subjective expectations. However, as 
discussed above, it is not clear that such a case has much practical significance, because the 
movement from the PSR to the WSR requires only modest assumptions about knowledge (name-
ly, the ability of market participants to learn from their mistakes). Even in the simplest, pure-
exchange economy, Mengerian price theory allows traders to have subjective expectations rele-
vant to that particular market (i.e., beliefs about other traders’ preferences), expectations that are 
incorporated into the PSR supply and demand curves.  
Vaughn argues that much stronger assumptions about knowledge and expectations are neces-
sary for economic analysis, even (presumably) for Mengerian price theory. 
If all action is speculation, if people are constantly reevaluating their preferences, 
if entrepreneurs make losses as well as profits, can we be so certain that markets 
are fundamentally orderly? Perhaps our world is one in which individual rational-
ity leads to overall waste and error. . . . Even more to the point, in a world of con-
stant change, how can people’s plans come to be realized? Why are speculators 
likely to be more right about entrepreneurial prospects than the entrepreneurs 
themselves? And how is successful rational action distinguishable from pure 
luck? What are the regularities in economic life that can be counted on to lend 
stability and predictability to an otherwise bewildering world? (Vaughn 1994, p. 
91) 
Most likely Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Wieser, Mises, and their Viennese contemporaries 
would have been baffled by the last statement in the quotation above. The science of economics, 
in Menger’s formulation, is about the explanation of regularities—the “exact laws” of reality 
described in the Investigations. As Menger wrote to Walras in 1884: 
It is rather necessary that we go back to the most simple elements of the mostly 
very complex phenomena that are here in question—that we thus determine in an 
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analytical manner the ultimate factors that constitute the phenomena, the prices, 
and that we then accord to these elements the importance that corresponds to their 
nature, and that, in keeping with this importance, we try to establish the laws ac-
cording to which the complex phenomena of human interaction result from simple 
phenomena. (quoted in Hülsmann 2007, p. 106) 
As Bastiat (1850) observed, Paris gets fed. The task of economics is to explain why. 
The early Austrians’ emphasis on order helps us understand Mises’s and Hayek’s statements, 
quoted at the beginning of the paper, about the close relationship between Austrian and neoclas-
sical economics. Menger, Walras, and Jevons all sought to explain the regularities of economic 
life. The historicists, by contrast, saw the economy as a chaotic flood that defied rational expla-
nation. Indeed, some contemporary interpretations of Austrian economics seem to place it closer 
to the German Historical School than the Austrian School. Vaughn, for example, writes of Mis-
es: 
[W]hat about sources of discoordination and disorder in [free, unhampered] mar-
kets? Mises really had very little to say about such problems, and in fact one con-
cludes that he thought disorder was a relatively minor problem. . . . [T]he only 
obvious sources of instability or disorder in his system were the consequences of 
bad banking institutions and destabilizing intervention on the part of government. 
Trade cycles were brought about by misguided credit policies. Unemployment 
was a consequence of minimum wage rates. Inflation was an increase in the quan-
tity of money brought about by government policy. Externalities were the conse-
quence of imperfectly specified property rights. He never considered possible 
sources of disorder internal to the market; disorder was an exogenous phenome-
non brought about by government regulation. . . . 
In this attitude . . . Mises is really not very different from many neoclassical eco-
nomic theorists (although perhaps more consistent and more outspoken than oth-
ers who shared his basic evaluation of the market). (Vaughn 1994, p. 90) 
I think Vaughn is correct that Mises thought “disorder,” in the sense she describes above, 
was a “relatively minor problem.” For Mises, economic theory is the analysis of coordination—
not the idea of “plan coordination” often associated with Hayek, or what O’Driscoll and Rizzo 
(1985) call “pattern coordination,” but what Mises, following W. H. Hutt, described as “price 
coordination” (Salerno 1991). This coordination, as noted below does not require any assump-
tions about the tendency of PSR or WSR prices to converge to FSR values. Full coordination of 
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plans occurs only in the ERE, a hypothetical state of affairs that does not (indeed, could not) oc-
cur in the real economy. For Mises, following Clark (1889), the FSR is an analytical device used 
to isolate the effects of specific changes in preferences, beliefs, resource availability, productive 
technology, and the like on the allocation of resources.18 
What does Mises mean by coordination, outside an imaginary world of perfect knowledge, 
consistent expectations, “rational” behavior, and the other assumptions of the First and Second 
Welfare Theorems of neoclassical economics? How, in other words, can Mises justify the effi-
ciency of resource allocation under capitalism without making strong assumptions about the 
closeness of real-world prices to some idealized, or “correct,” prices? 
Central to the neoclassical notion of efficiency is the idea that only FSR prices count for as-
sessing the welfare properties of the market.19 A primary objective of Kirzner’s account of the 
entrepreneurial market process is to show that the movement from PSR prices to their Marshal-
lian/Walrasian FSR equivalents is not automatic and instantaneous, but the result of entrepreneu-
rial behavior. In Kirzner’s framework, the market does possess equilibrating tendencies, but 
these tendencies are not exogenous, but result from the actions of entrepreneurs alert to the profit 
opportunities created by temporary trading at false, i.e., non-FSR, prices. For Kirzner, PSR pric-
es themselves are not particularly important; what matters is whether they tend to converge to-
ward their FSR values. Kirzner’s concept of alertness can thus be seen as an addendum to the 
neoclassical understanding of market equilibrium. Kirzner’s approach, as Boettke (Boettke and 
Prychitka 1994, p. 3) describes it, “provided the disequilibrium foundations of equilibrium eco-
nomics that were required to complete the neoclassical project of explicating the operating prin-
ciples of the price system.” Kirzner’s objective, in this sense, is to justify the use of FSR, or near-
FSR, prices in welfare analysis. If the market possesses equilibrating tendencies, then the welfare 
theorems of neoclassical economics are reasonable criteria for assessing market performance, 
                                                 
18 Note that Clark (1907, p. 96) describes simple FSR analysis or comparative statics—e.g., if the supply increases, 
the price will fall, ceteris paribus—as obvious, as what he calls a “commercial fact.” 
19 And these FSR prices are only “efficient” in perfectly competitive markets; any degree of asymmetric information 
renders economic outcomes inefficient (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). 
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and the main talk of welfare economics should be the analysis of these tendencies and of market 
interventions that inhibit the process of equilibration (Kirzner 1988).20 
Salerno (1991, 1999b) offers a different interpretation of Mises, arguing that Mengerian price 
theory is primarily a theory of PSR prices, not FSR prices. In this view, the existence or nonexis-
tence of equilibrating tendencies in the unhampered market—the issue that divided “Kirzneri-
ans” and “Lachmannians,” and dominated much of the Austrian discussion in the 1980s—is rela-
tively unimportant. For Mises, the critical “market process” is not the convergence to equilib-
rium, but the selection mechanism in which unsuccessful entrepreneurs—those who systemati-
cally overbid for factors, relative to eventual consumer demands—are eliminated from the mar-
ket (Mises 1951). In this context, the recent debate over “de-homogenizing” Mises and Hayek 
(Rothbard 1991; Salerno 1993, 1994b, 1996; Yeager 1994, 1995, 1997; Herbener 1996; Hoppe 
1996; Stalebrink 2004) deals not simply with the socialist calculation debate or second-order dis-
tinctions between “calculation” and “knowledge,” but with a fundamentally new interpretation of 
Austrian price theory, a causal-realist approach to the market that differs in important ways from 
the Marshallian/Walrasian analysis that fills the contemporary textbooks. Austrian economics, in 
this view, is not simply neoclassical microeconomics—what Caldwell (2004, pp. 328-88) calls 
“basic economic reasoning”—plus the Mises-Hayek theory of the business cycle plus knowl-
edge, process, plan coordination, and spontaneous order, but a fundamentally different kind of 
microeconomics.21 
                                                 
20 Adds Boettke (2005):  
Why is all this important? Well as Franklin Fischer pointed out in his very important book The 
Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics (1983) that unless we have good reasons 
to believe in the systemic tendency toward equilibrium we have no justification at all in upholding 
the welfare properties of equilibrium economics. In other words, without the sort of explanation 
that Kirzner provides the entire enterprise of neoclassical equilibrium is little more than a leap of 
faith. 
If one rejects the neoclassical equilibrium concept as a welfare benchmark, though, this justification is unnecessary. 
21 Caldwell (2004, pp. 333) argues that Austrians accept “the simple (although unrealistic) models used for basic 
economic reasoning,” such as supply-and-demand analysis, at least for market-level predictions. But Menger’s anal-
ysis, while abstract, is not unrealistic in the sense of Walras’s or Marshall’s models of market exchange. In Long’s 
(2006) terminology, Austrians reject “precisive abstraction,” in which false assumptions are deliberately included to 
simplify the analysis, while embracing “non-precisive abstraction,” in which certain characteristics of the situation 
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In a recent response to Salerno, Kirzner (1999) takes a characteristically subtle position on 
the relationship between PSR and FSR prices. He argues the PSR is an “equilibrium” only in a 
trivial sense and that PSR prices are not meaningful for assessing the welfare properties of mar-
kets. He also recognizes that PSR analysis was important to Mises. To solve this seeming con-
tradiction, he says that Mises used the PSR only to defend the concept of consumer sovereignty, 
not for analysis of the market process. However, if PSR prices are sufficient to assure that pro-
duction is satisfying consumer wants, it is unclear why FSR prices are important, and why one 
would care about the alleged tendency of PSR prices to reach them. 
5. A New Way forward for Austrian Economics: Developing the Mundane Paradigm 
The main argument of this paper is that Austrian economics is primarily mundane econom-
ics—the theory and applications of value, production, exchange, price, capital, money, the firm, 
regulation, comparative institutions, and other “mainstream” topics. What makes Austrian eco-
nomics unique is its causal-realist approach to these issues, not its attention to adjustment proc-
esses, the formation of knowledge and expectations, spontaneous order, plan or pattern coordina-
tion, radical subjectivism, and other manifestations of “disequilibrium” economics. Such issues 
are interesting and potentially important, but are ultimately subordinate to the main task of eco-
nomic analysis, the development, extension, application, and refinement of the mundane Aus-
trian tradition established by Menger. Naturally, this means that students of Austrian economics 
must invest significant time in mastering the existing literature before engaging in their own cre-
ative restatement and revision.  
To give only one example, Austrian economics is attracting increasing attention among ap-
plied researchers in business administration, in fields such as strategic management, organiza-
tional economics, and the theory of the firm (Jacobson 1992; Foss and Klein 2002; Roberts and 
Eisenhardt 2003; Yu 2003; Mathews 2006; Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein 2007; Chiles, Bluedorn, 
and Gupta 2007). Often the value-added of Austrian economics in these fields is seen as its em-
                                                                                                                                                             
are simply not specified. In other words, the “basic economic reasoning” of the Austrians is different from the basic 
economic reasoning of neoclassical economics. 
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phasis on disequilibrium, which seems to fit the profit-seeking approach of strategic management 
better than do neoclassical partial- and general-equilibrium models. Here a more sophisticated 
and nuanced understanding of equilibrium would be helpful, however. Organizational structures 
that are implemented, contracts that are signed and executed, and other business arrangements 
that take place in real markets are equilibrium phenomena, in the PSR sense of equilibrium. They 
should be explainable using the same causal-realistic mechanism used by the Austrians to ex-
plain real prices and quantities. FSR analysis, as practiced by Mises, should also apply here: 
how, for instance, does the profit-and-loss mechanism provide incentives for agents to restruc-
ture PSR arrangements so that they move toward their FSR equivalents? How do changes in reg-
ulation or other aspects of public policy, or exogenous changes in the competitive or technologi-
cal environments, replace one PSR with another? 
Unfortunately, despite the pleas of modern Austrians for more analysis of “process,” very lit-
tle progress has been made in this area within the Austrian literature. Indeed, the bulk of the 
work during the last few decades in evolutionary economics, dynamic programming, evolution-
ary game theory, Bayesian learning models, agent-based simulations, complexity theory, and the 
like is fundamentally a-causal and nonrealistic, an extension of the mathematical economics of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985, pp. 65–66) cite 
some examples of these literatures, implying that they are “Hayekian” in spirit; however, despite 
sharing certain keywords with Austrian economics, it is unclear that these research programs 
have been influenced in any way by the core contributions or approach of the Austrian School.  
Of course, the argument here is not knowledge, expectations, and process are unimportant, or 
that they should be ignored by Austrians (or by any social scientists), but that they are secondary, 
and valuable only to the extent they help construct a more satisfactory theory of markets and 
prices. Austrian economics emerged as a causal, realistic alternative to the historicism of its day, 
and remains today an alternative both to mechanistic neoclassical economics and to the non-
economics of old-style institutionalism. Without a commitment to preserving and extending the 
hard core of Austrian price theory, the distinct place of the Austrian School will be lost. 
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